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In this paper we analyze the trend of the gender gap between wives and husbands for 
Mediterranean countries with a strong family tradition, using data from the European 
Household Panel (ECHP) of 2001 and the European Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) of 2006. In general, wives and husbands, when married, have the 
same characteristics but wives suffer from two types of discrimination with respect to 
husbands: a lower wage for the same work and a primary responsibility for children. This 
paper uses quantile regression and counterfactual decomposition methods to investigate 
whether a glass ceiling exists or if instead a sticky floor is more prevalent among European 
families over time (2001 and 2006). We correct for selectivity the unconditional wage 
distribution of married women and we show that the wage gap decomposition is different if 
we ignore self-selection. We find that the wage gap is positive in each country, and the 
greater part of it is composed of a discrimination effect, while the characteristics effect is 
small. In Mediterranean countries, wives suffer from the sticky floor effect, i.e. the gender gap 
is bigger at the bottom of distribution, while we can observe that the glass ceiling effect 
decreased in most countries in 2006. 
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The gender pay gap refers to the dierences between the wages earned by
women and men. It is an evident and documented fact that men earn higher
wages than women, even after checking both for observable characteristics
related to their productivity and the overall wage structure (see, e.g., Blau
and Kahn, 2000).
Reducing the gender pay gap is an important topic on the European po-
litical agenda. In 2003 the member countries formulated the plan to achieve
by 2010 a substantial reduction in the gender pay gap in each Member State
(Council Decision 2003 L197/20). The persistence of the gender pay gap is
the result of direct discrimination against women and structural inequal-
ities, such as segregation in sectors, occupations, access to education and
training, biased evaluation and pay systems, etc. A large amount of empir-
ical research tends to explain the trend of the wage gap in Europe, but few
studies concentrate on the gap that exists in a family. If we look at Figure
1 we nd that the unadjusted gender gap has increased in the last few years
in Spain, Italy and Portugal and decreased in Greece and France, but with
respect to 1995 it has increased in all Mediterranean countries.
There are many papers concerning the evolution over time of wage in-
equality that take into consideration the dierent aspects of the labor mar-
ket, such as education, public or private sector, etc., but of investigation the
degree to which the gender gap in a family may vary across wages distribu-
tion, and why, is very scarce.
De la Rica, Dolado and Llorens (2005) using 1999 data for Spain found
that the gender wage gap is expanding over the wage distribution only for
the group with college/tertiary education. For less educated groups, the
gender wage gap is wider at the bottom than the top. Thus, in Spain
for the better educated there is a glass ceiling while for the less educated
there is not. Using a dierent decomposition methodology in the quantile
regressions framework and Spanish data for 1995, del Rio, Gradin and Canto
(2005) obtain similar results to de la Rica et. al.
Albrecht, Bjorklund and Vroman (2003), analyzing Swedish data relating
to 1998, show that the gender wage gap is increasing throughout the wage
distribution and accelerating at the top, and they interpret this as evidence
of a glass ceiling in Sweden.
The increasing labor market participation of women, changing family
forms and family responsibility, has made the compromise between work
and family one of the major topics of the European social agenda. Countries
have dierent social and labor market policies, sometimes focusing on more

exible working hours, occasionally encouraging the supply of public and
private services and sometimes with policies to increase an equal distribution
of earnings. The discrimination in a family comes from two sources: family
responsibilities, such as looking after children (see table13), and lower wages
2Figure 1: Gender pay gap in unadjusted form
Data source: EUROSTAT Gender pay gap is given as the dierence between average gross hourly earnings of
male paid employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings of male
paid employees. The population consists of all paid employees aged 16{64 that are at work more than 15 hours
per week.Data source: EUROSTAT Gender pay gap is given as the dierence between average gross hourly
earnings of male paid employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings
of male paid employees. The population consists of all paid employees aged 16{64 that are at work more than
15 hours per week.
with respect to the husband's even with the same characteristics; at times,
this gap in earnings creates con
icts in the family and psychological problems
for women.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the gender gap between husbands
and wives and its evolution from 2001 to 2006, using data from the Euro-
pean Community Household Panel and the European Survey on Income and
Living Conditions.
We explain why countries with poor policies for child-care, 
exibility
of work etc., are more unequal. Normally these countries belong to the
Mediterranean area, with a strong tradition in the family, and most of them
suer from the sticky 
oor eect, i.e. the gender pay gap is bigger at the
bottom of the wage distribution.
To estimate the dierence in earnings in an Mediterranean family we
consider the standard methodology such as the Blinder-Oaxaca (1973) de-
compositions and the quantile regression method using a Machado-Mata
(2005) and Melly's decomposition (2006). However, a signicant part of
3the women in the sample do not work, so if unobservable characteristics in
the wage and in the participation equations are correlated so we need to
take into account the sample selection that females' wages suer, and use
a proper treatment. Correcting for sample selection is also essential if we
want to compare the gender gap between countries.
This chapter is structured in several sections. The rst is a brief introduc-
tion about the data we use for our research. After we show the unadjusted
gender gap in Europe over time, the adjusted gender gap and the estimation
methods of the wage equation with the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. At
end we present the method of Melly's quantile regression and counterfactual
distribution, and the empirical evidence in ve European countries.
2 Data
The data analyzed in this work come from a survey by the European Com-
munity Household Panel (ECHP) and the EU-SILC (European Income and
Living Conditions).
The ECHP is a multi-country annual longitudinal survey of collected
data since 19941 in 15 European Union Member States under Eurostat (Sta-
tistical Oce of the European Communities) coordination.
The data set covers approximately 130,000 individuals from 60,000 house-
holds in the fteen countries which were EU members in 2000, re
ecting
population changes over time through a continuous evolution of the sample.
The panel data cover a wide range of subjects such as demographics, labor
force behavior, income, health, education and training, housing, poverty and
social exclusion, etc.
The survey is structured in the form of annual interviews with a particu-
lar representative sample of household members in each country. Interviews
were conducted following a standardized questionnaire, although each coun-
try could modify the questionnaire's wording to some extent, to re
ect its
own institutional arrangements.
The sample is constructed as an unbalanced panel of all women between
the ages of 25 and 55 years, who are married with or without children,
matched with their husbands who are presently employed or out of the la-
bor force. We excluded self-employed and not economically active people
(pensioners, the military, etc). The size of this sample varies across coun-
tries.
The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) is an instrument aiming at collecting timely and comparable cross-
1Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K., Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Italy and Spain started in 1994 (wave 1), Austria joined in 1995 (wave 2),
Finland joined in 1996 (wave 3).
4sectional and longitudinal multidimensional microdata on income, poverty,
social exclusion and living conditions.
The EU-SILC aims to provide two types of data:
- Cross-sectional data pertaining to a given time or a certain time pe-
riod with variables on income, poverty, social exclusion and other living
conditions.
- Longitudinal data pertaining to individual-level changes over time, ob-
served periodically, typically over a four year period.
Social exclusion and housing condition information is collected at house-
hold level while labor, education and health information is obtained for peo-
ple aged 16 and over. The core of the instrument, income at very detailed
component level, is mainly collected at personal level but a few components
are included in the household part of the SILC.
The variables refer to the personal characteristics of individuals (age,
work experience, education) and characteristics of the household family.
We take into consideration all married couples who have a positive wage
and work for at least 8 hours per week to reduce the measurement error
connected with the wage measure. All income variables are de
ated with
CPI (Consumer Price Index) so a comparison among years is possible.
Table 1 shows the participation rate of husbands and wives, calculated on
the last wave of the ECHP(2001) and the EU-SILC data in 2006, considering
the husbands and wives who work part-time or full-time. In these samples
the female participation rate is very dierent with respect to husbands. It
increased in 2006 around 5%-7% in all countries, except in Portugal where
it remained the same. France and Portugal are the countries with a higher
employment rate compared to other Mediterranean countries.
We can conclude that the Lisbon target, where the European Union had
xed that the women of working age who participate in the labor market
in 2010, have to be more that 60%, is well above that of Italy, Spain and
Greece.
Table 1: Participation rate of husbands and wives in the ECHP
and EU-SILC
EU-SILC ECHP
Country Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
France 69.51 88.53 64.88 87.43
Italy 51.21 87.28 44.24 82.02
Portugal 69.53 88.47 69.34 90.35
Spain 51.85 88.32 45.93 87.52
Greece 52.72 89.31 41.34 83.26
Source: ECHP 2001 and EU-SILC 2006, husband and wife of working age, who
are employed part-time or full-time
53 The unadjusted gender pay gap
We rst analyze the raw or unadjusted gender gap across Europe in the
years 1994 and 2001 using the ECHP data set. The earnings measure for
the raw gap is the average of the gross de
ated hourly wage. Wages in
the ECHP are not directly observed, but obtained by dividing the current
monthly total gross earnings by the total number of hours worked per week,
multiplied by 4.3.
Table 2 shows the average gender gap in European countries in 1994 and
2001. The absolute gender gap, calculated as the dierence between husband
minus wife's average gross hourly wage, increased in 2001 for France, the
U.K, Denmark, Portugal, Greece, Spain, Belgium, Finland and Austria,
while it decreased for the rest of the countries.
In Figure 2, the relative wage gap is presented, calculated as the ratio
between the absolute wage gap and the average male wage rate. The rel-
ative wage gap in 2001 between husbands and wives in EU varied between
6% in Italy and 28% in the U.K. The largest reduction between the year
1994 and 2001 is observed in Ireland (-8%) and Italy (-7%), while the U.K.,
France, Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands presented a reduction of ap-
proximately -2% in 2001. In Spain, Portugal and Greece we observe an
increase of around 4% in the gender gap in 2001, while in Denmark, Austria
and Germany the gender gap increased about 2% in 2001. This work is in
accordance with Sissoko et al (2006) and Beblo et al (2003) studies.
In Figure 3 we report the average hourly wage for husbands and wives,
the absolute wage gap and the relative wage gap calculated on the sample
EU-SILC in 2006 for Mediterranean countries. The relative wage gap is high
in Spain and France, around 12% and 18% respectively.








Germany 23.1 17.49 5.61 22.59 17.31 5.28
Denmark 129.95 109.69 20.26 112.42 97.68 14.74
The Netherlands 25.41 19.32 6.09 29.36 21.51 7.85
Belgium 520.31 440.94 79.37 457.86 383.88 73.98
France 74.58 60.89 13.69 76.25 61.36 14.89
U.K. 9.33 7 2.33 7.66 5.46 2.2
Ireland 10.42 8.7 1.72 8.51 6.44 2.07
Italy 15121.37 14268.14 853.23 15100.26 1398.27 13701.99
Greece 1997.64 1641.29 356.35 1358.76 1145.87 212.89
Spain 1267.47 1057.39 210.08 1094.64 978.6 116.04
Portugal 774.32 662.55 111.77 681.05 604.26 76.79
Austria 139.22 104.86 34.36 151.6 114.65 36.95
Finland 70.67 55.81 14.86 66.92 51.89 15.03
Data source: ECHP local currency, husband and wife in working age, who are employed
at least 8 hours per week. For Austria has used the wave 1995 and Finland has used wave
1996
7Figure 2: Relative raw wage gap in European countries: ECHP
1994-2001
Data source: ECHP average hourly wage in local currency, husband and wife in working
age, who are employed at least 8 hours per week. For Austria has used the wave 1995 and
Finland has used wave 1996
8Figure 3: Relative raw wage gap in European countries: EU-SILC
2006
Data source: EU-SILC average hourly wage, husband and wife in working age, who are
employed at least 8 hours per week.
4 The adjusted gender pay gap
Male and female workers dier with respect to many characteristics, in-
cluding the length of work experience, the level of education and skills, the
occupational status and the sector of employment. Each of these charac-
teristics has some association with the level of earnings so the unadjusted
pay gap does not compare like with like. It is appropriate to decompose the
gender pay gap to distinguish what proportion of the overall pay gap is due
to dierences in individual characteristics and what proportion is due to sex
discrimination within the labor market. This method is called the adjusted
gender pay gap and it oers clarity by identifying the pay dierential be-
tween male and female workers after controlling for dierences in individual
characteristics.
Most empirical studies of wage discrimination between men and women
use a formal statistical technique rst devised by Oaxaca (1973), building
9on Becker's (1971) well-known theory of labor market discrimination (see
also Blinder 1973).
The decomposition approach of Oaxaca develops the concept of discrimi-
nation, considering the individual employee productive characteristics (such
as level of education, years of work experience and so on) that can be used
as approximations of his or her marginal productivity. Certain individual
characteristics can be identied as associated with a person's productive
capability and this, in turn, is associated with the wages earned.
The Oaxaca method is used to check for dierences in characteristics
between men and women. More formally, following Mincers (1974), a wage
equation that relates to the logarithm of earnings as a function of individual




















where lnWi represents the average earnings evaluated by an earnings
equation, the indices H and W represent husband's and wife's earnings re-
spectively, Xi is the average characteristics and  is the estimated returns
on these characteristics.
The gap in the average earnings (expressed as a logarithm) can be broken
down in two parts: the rst represents the dierence in observable human
capital of men and women (endowment eects), and the second represents
the unexplained component (interpreted as wage discrimination) which in-
cludes a dierence due to unobservable factors that in
uence productivity
and a dierence due to dierential reward for equal characteristics called
remuneration eects or discrimination eects.
In Oaxaca`s (1973) original application, separate estimates are obtained
using both the male and the female weighting procedure to establish a range
of possible values. All methods of decomposition of the wage gap must deal
with the problem of the choice of weighting. In equation (1), dierences in
characteristics are weighted by the average male returns, and dierences in
returns are weighted by the average female characteristics. Here we have
chosen to use the method proposed by Oaxaca and Ransom (1994). This
involves the construction of a nondiscriminatory norm for returns on in-
dividual characteristics; the wage gap is then expressed as the sum of an
advantage for men and a disadvantage for women, and the dierence be-
tween characteristics valued at the norms returns.
In the last section we use and explain the quantile regression method
proposed by Koenker and Basset (1978) and apply the new methods of
estimation proposed in Machado and Mata in 2005 and Melly in 2006, to
estimate the wage decomposition. These new techniques are more 
exible
and give more information on the wage gap distribution considering not only
the means of variables but also the dierence at various quantiles of wage
distributions.
105 The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method
When we want to estimate the wage equation for married women we face
the problem of the selection bias. We have selection bias because the depen-
dent variable of the wage equation can be measured only if the individual
participates in the labor market. The literature oers estimators to correct
this problem (Heckman 1979, Powell 1994).
We can write the wage equation as a combination of Mincerian explana-
tory variables:
ln(WJ
i ) = XJ
i  + J
i ; J = H;W
where ln(Wi) is the logarithmic wage for husband and wife (H, W), Xi
is a vector of explanatory variables such as age, experience, education, etc.
and J
i is an i.i.d. error term.
Almost all studies t the wage by the OLS (Ordinary Least Square)
equation and estimate the gender gap, but normally a signicant part of the
sample of wives does not work, which may be a non-random sample of all
married women if there are variables that aect participation in the labor
force. If so, then OLS on the sample of working women will be biased and
inconsistent. The dierence between workers and non-workers determines
the sample selection bias because some components of the work decision
are relevant to determining the wage process. Moreover, the unobservable
characteristics aect the work decision and the wage.
To correct the selection, Heckman (1979) proposed two methods: maxi-
mum likelihood estimation and estimation of the wage equation in two steps,
rst estimating the female participation equation and calculating a correc-
tion term, called lambda or the inverse Mill's ratio, and then estimating by
simple regression the wage equation in order that the corrections terms are
added as an independent variable.
We can write the participation equation as:
q
it = ai + Xit + vit (2)
qit = 1[q
it  0] (3)
where q
it is a the participation equation of wives in the labor market,
and depends on a vector of explanatory variables (Xit) as age, education,
children and no-labor income. We observe the participation equation only
if the selection indicator function qit is equal to 1, i.e. only if the women are
participating on the labor market.








11where () and () denote the probability density and cumulative distribu-
tion functions of the standard normal distribution.
As a second stage we estimate the wage equation for married women
with the OLS approach, so the equation becomes:
ln(W) = 0Xi +  + i (5)
where ln(W) is the logarithm of the hourly wage and is observed only for
workers, Xi are observed variables related to labor supply characteristics
(potential work experience, education level) and labor demand characteris-
tics (type of occupation, size of the rm, permanent or temporary contract
and full time or part time job),  is the error correct term, and i is the
error term that includes all unobserved determinants of wages.
The Heckman model requires three assumptions: joint normality of the
distribution of the error terms in the participation and wage equations; both
error terms are independent of both sets of observable variables; and the nal
assumption is the standard normalization for the probit selection equation.
When we apply the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and the wage equa-
tion is corrected for selection, we have three eects: endowment, remunera-
tion and selection.





















where the last term is the selection eect and b  is an estimate of .
Normally the b H is equal to zero, because there is not male selection,
while the selection for females is b F > 0. When we consider the sample
selection, the impact on the remuneration and endowment eectss is am-
biguous. In several empirical studies the results dier when applying the
Heckman method and OLS. In Miller and Rummery (1991) the endowment
eects declines and the remuneration eects increases. In a study by Miller
(1987) both eects decline.
6 Wage gap estimation
Results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
We estimate the wage equation with the simple OLS methods for husbands
and the Heckman techniques for wives. We use the Oaxaca decomposition
to investigate the gender gap in the family.
12The explanatory variables we use to estimate the wage equation with
OLS are: experience, experience square,2 three levels of education (post-
graduate, secondary, less than secondary), job characteristics such as rm
size, sector and occupational groups when husbands and wives work at least
8 hours per week.
The participation equation to obtain the correct term for the wife wage
equation is composed of: age, age square, children with three dierent age
levels, education and household income without the wife's earnings.
In gures 4 to 7 we analyze the Oaxaca decomposition over the period
1994 and 2001, where the wage equation is estimated with an OLS and a
Heckman methods.
The decomposition by the OLS method identies the explained and dis-
crimination part of the gender gap, while with the Heckman method we
have a third component: the selection eect. We observe that the endow-
ment eects estimated with the OLS in 1994 (see Figure 4), are negative in
France, Spain, Italy and Greece and positive and very high only in Portu-
gal. The endowment eects or characteristics eects when negative means
that in a labor market with no discrimination females should expect to have
higher wages than males. This is explained by the fact that females exhibit
higher education than males. However, the discrimination eects in the la-
bor market is more than compensated for by the endowment eects, and
consequently means that males receive higher wages than females.
In gure 5, we report the wage decomposition in 2001 estimated by
the OLS. Discrimination increased in Portugal and decreased in the other
Mediterranean countries. In France and Spain the endowment eects in-
creased and as a consequence discrimination decreased, while Italy and
Greece continued to have a negative and increasing endowment eects.
We show in gures 6 and 7 the wage decomposition corrected for selection
bias. The framework is dierent from the OLS estimation.
The Heckman method reveals that the potential wage gap between women
and men, in the absence of selection, would be lower than that observed.
The selection eects increased in each country in 2001 in comparison to
1994, while the discrimination eects or remuneration eects increased in
Portugal by about 20%, decreased in France, the U.K., Germany and The
Netherlands by about 20% and in Italy decreased about 40%. The wage dif-
ferential explained by dierent characteristics of women and men increased
in almost all countries in 2001.
2We use potential experience, calculated as age minus age when starting rst job. We
are not able to use actual experience because in the ECHP we do not have information
on previous work life before entering the survey.
137 Quantile regression and wage decomposition
In recent years a new literature has estimated the gender pay gap based
on the quantile regression, by looking at the eects of gender and other
covariates on dierent quantiles of log wage distribution and not only at the
average of variables.
Koenker-Basset (1978) proposed a complete by new and dierent method
of calculating the quantile regression that can be estimated by minimizing
in () the following expression:






; (i = 1;:::::n);
with the check function  weighting the residuals i asymmetrically:
(i) =
(
i if i  0;
(   1)i if i < 0:
Starting from the study of Koenker-Basset (1978), Machado and Mata
(M-M) in 2005 proposed a method to extend the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition based on the quantile regression. Considering two groups, 0
and 1, whose stochastic characteristics for each group are X0 and X1, the
regression quantile can be written for each group as:
Qy(Y jX) = Xi() 8;i 2 (0;1) (7)
where Y jX is the conditional quantile. M-M propose an estimation of the
counterfactual unconditional wage distribution, generate a random sample of
size m from a uniform distribution U[0;1], and then calculate the conditional
quantile regression for each group. They simulate the wage distribution of
the second group on the basis of the wage distribution and the characteristics
of the rst group, and repeat these steps m times.
The dierence of the unconditional quantiles between the two groups can
be decomposed as:
b F 1
Y 1(jT = 1)   b F 1
Y 0(jT = 0) = b F 1
Y 1(jT = 1)   b F 1




Y 1(jT = 0)   b F 1




Y t (jT = t) denotes the th quantile of wage Y for groups t's
while b F 1
Y 1(jT = 0) is the counterfactual unconditional wage distribution.
14Normally it is easy to estimate the conditional distribution function by
inverting the conditional quantile function. However, the estimated condi-
tional quantile function is not necessarily monotonic and so it may not be
easy to invert it.
Melly in 2006 proposed integrating the conditional distributions over
the range of covariates in order to obtain an estimate of the unconditional
distribution. Melly showed that if the number of steps m repeated in M-
M goes to innity the procedure of the decomposition is the same as M-M
when both the sample size and the number of quantiles are suciently large.





yt (jXi)  q) =
Z 1
0
1(Xi b t()  q)d (8)




1(Xi b t()  q)d =
n X
j=1
(j   j 1)1(Xi b t()  q) (9)
This implies that the unconditional distribution function can be written as:





The unconditional and counterfactual quantiles distribution are respectively:





c Fyt(qjXi)  g (11)





c Fyt(qjXi)  g (12)
The decomposition of the dierence between the th quantile of the un-
conditional distribution of two groups is:
b q1()   b q0() = b q1()   c qc1()
| {z }
characteristics




Selection bias is present when the outcome of interest is only observ-
able for a subsample of individuals. Heckman in 1974 and 1979 proposed
a parametric estimator to estimate covariates with selection bias. This ap-
proach is inconsistent if the error term is misspecied. Powell (1987)and
Newey(1991) proposed a semi-parametric estimator for the sample selection
model. More recently Das, Newey and Vella(2003) proposed a nonparamet-
ric estimator for this model. Buchinsky in 1998 and 2001 was the rst to
apply the semiparametric sample selection model for quantile regression.
15Concerning the selection in the wage equation of women, we follow
the Buchinsky (1998a) estimation. We calculate the quantile regression of
women as:
Qy(YwjX) = Xw() + h(zw
) 8 2 (0;1) (14)
The vector Z is a set of observable characteristics that in
uence the
probability that a woman participates in the labor market. These variables
are uncorrelated with the log of the wage and they are: dummy for children
with dierent ages, education, age, age square, household income without
wife's earnings, unemployment benet of their husbands, if they receive it.
The term h(zw
) correct the selection at th quantile. It represents
the inverse Mill's ratio in the Heckman method. To estimate this term
Buchinsky (1998a) suggests a series of estimators, we consider this one:
h(zw
) = {0() + 1()(zw
) + 2()(zw)2 (15)
The asymptotic distribution of () for a given quantile  is a non iid
setting. We calculate the asymptotic variance of
p
nXi b t(j) using the
"Hendricks-Koenker sandwich" following Hendricks and Koenker (1992),
Koenker (2005), and Melly (2006), and we correct the standard error with
a bootstrap estimation for 100 times.
8 Empirical Results of Quantile Regression
The estimation of the wage gap between husbands and wives, following the
method described above, is reported in Figures 9 to 13 for each country
that we take into consideration in this paper and the dierent data set used:
ECHP in 2001 and EU-SILC in 2006.
We can test several hypotheses such as the presence of a glass ceiling or
sticky 
oors. Usually, the literature has identied the existence of a glass
ceiling when the pay gap is signicantly larger at the top of the distribution
and a sticky 
oor when the wage gap is larger at the bottom. We dene the
existence of a glass ceiling if the 95th percentile wage gap is higher than 2%
with respect to 50th percentile while the sticky 
oor eect exists if the 10th
percentile wage gap is higher than the 25th percentile by at least 2%.
Looking at the wage gap distribution in 2001 with the ECHP data we
see that it is positive and its distribution varies greatly across quantiles
(Figures 9-13). In table 3 we analyze the wage gap and its components for
each country in dierent quantiles (10th;25th;50th;75thand 95th).
We can see that the rst component, the characteristics eects, is equally
distributed among quantiles in each country between wives and husbands
(Figures 9-13), and the proportion of the observed wage gap that is explained
by the dierences in returns to characteristics is very low along the wage
distribution.
16A negative percentage value implies that women have better character-
istics than men that compensate them for discrimination. The negative
characteristics are present in the Mediterranean countries at the top of the
wage distribution. These results conrm that husbands and wives have the
same characteristics when they get married, a result that we can nd in Del
Boca-Flinn (2006), Chiappori et al (2007)
The second component of the wage gap is the coecient eects. This
eect is positive and explains most of the wage gap (Table 3) in all countries,
so the gender gap is also positive and varies across the wage distribution.
In table 3 we present the results of the quantile regression and we can
check the existence of a sticky 
oor or a glass ceiling in Mediterranean
countries with the ECHP in 2001.
According with our denition of sticky 
oor and glass ceiling eects, we
have found that Spain, Italy, Greece and France suer a sticky 
oor eect.
Women at the bottom(10th percentile) are more disadvantaged with respect
to those at the 25th percentile. Portugal presents a positive discrimination
which is high for the quantiles between 10th and 70th.
The glass ceiling eect is present only in France according to the deni-
tion we have used.
The same analysis was carried out for the EU-SILC data set in 2006. We
always nd a positive gender pay gap (Figures 9-13). The characteristics
eects are move up for France, Greece, Spain and Italy especially at the
bottom of the wage distribution. In Portugal it continues to be negative,
increasing not only in the last 50th quantiles but also at the bottom of the
distribution. Negative characteristics eects have the same signicance that
we explained above using the Oaxaca method.
The coecient eect has suered the same increase, but only at the
bottom of distribution, while it has gone down at the top of it.
To check for sticky 
oor and glass ceiling in 2006 in Mediterranean coun-
tries we can see table 4. We f nd that all countries except Portugal show
a wage gap greater that 2 % at the bottom of the wage distribution re-
spect to the 50th quantile. We continue to nd the glass ceiling in France,
while in other countries the dierence between the 50th and 90th quantile
has decreased.
Figure 11 presents a scatter plot illustrating the correlation for European
countries between the sticky 
oor phenomena and the OECD work-family
index. This index is a group of indicators that sum up the family policies
such as child-care, maternity leave, 
exi-time etc. The graph shows that the
work-family index is negative correlated with the country that suers the
sticky 
oor eect. Countries with not very generous work-family policies
have a bigger wage gap at the bottom of the distribution.
179 Discussion and Conclusions
This work shows dierent techniques of decomposing the wage gap between
husbands and wives. We nd that the distribution of characteristics is the
same between husband and wife but the wages that they receive are dierent.
Mediterranean women with large gender dierences in earnings oppor-
tunities reinforce traditional divisions of labor at the household level, pre-
venting individuals and couples from deciding on a dierent organization of
the household and caring responsibilities.
The wage gap is more evident for married women at the bottom of the
wage distribution in Southern countries.
The women who receive low wages are normally less well educated and
with a high rate of fertility, so family policies such as child care, parental
leave and equal opportunities, or wage setting institutions or cultural tra-
ditions, are likely to aect gender wage gaps. Mothers are most likely to
use parental leave with respect to fathers, implying that women reduce their
work experience and undermine their earnings capacity. Another factor cor-
related with the gender gap is the occupational segregation that women are
more exposed to. Women are caught up in some female-typed jobs (see ta-
ble 5), where the economics opportunity in terms of powerful position and
earnings are limited. The public sector is one of the most attractive sectors
for women due to its protective nature, 
exible working hours and greater
tolerance to absenteeism (Esping-Andersen 1990). In the Mediterranean
countries such types of jobs are traditionally mainly assigned to women.
Blau and Kahn (2003) show that the expected impact of the policies of
parental leave and child care is unclear a priori; a woman who is not eligible
for parental leave may lose her job or re-enter the labor market at a lower
level after having a child, while women who do have access to parental leave
might have higher relative earnings, due to the policy preserving their ties to
the rms, so there is a correlation between parental leave and higher female
pay.
Brayan et al in 2006 with the ECHP data showed that Southern coun-
tries with a strong tradition of family and poor family policies suer from
the phenomena of the sticky 
oor while Scandinavian countries with strong
family policies are aected by the glass ceiling eect.
We nd the same results with ECHP for husbands and wives in 2001.
Figure 14 shows as Mediterranean countries with poor family policies are
more subject to the sticky 
oor eect.
By applying the quantile regression procedure, we understand the dif-
ferent gender gap between husbands and wives in Mediterranean countries
with a strong family tradition, along their wage distribution.
The gender pay gap is positive in all countries, and most of it is made
up of the discrimination eect. While the characteristics eects are around
zero and substantially the same across countries and across year, thus con-
18rming that men and women married partners with the same characteristics
the return in coecient are large and vary across the distribution and across
countries. We observed that in 2006 the wage gap was greater with respect
to 2001 and the glass ceiling phenomenon was less strong in all countries.
Portugal conrmed it self as bring exception in the labor market in Mediter-
ranean countries.
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32Table 3: Estimated Wage Gap: Characteristics and Coecients












10 0.23 0.02 0.25 0.28 0.01 0.21
% 92.00 8.00 37.31 96.55 3.45 25.66
25 0.21 0.02 0.23 0.18 0.02 0.20
% 91.30 8.70 34.33 90.00 10.00 17.70
50 0.18 0.01 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.18
% 94.74 5.26 28.36 100.00 - 15.04
75 0.16 -0.03 0.13 0.19 -0.01 0.18
% 123.08 -23.08 19.40 105.56 -5.56 15.93
95 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.24 0.05 0.29












10 0.22 0.03 0.27 0.16 0.04 0.20
% 88.00 12.00 25.77 80.00 20.00 24.39
25 0.20 0.02 0.22 0.18 0.04 0.22
% 90.91 9.09 22.68 81.82 18.18 26.83
50 0.22 0.00 0.22 0.25 0.01 0.26
% 100.00 22.68 96.15 3.85 31.71
75 0.23 -0.06 0.17 0.19 -0.08 0.11
% 135.29 -35.29 17.53 172.73 -72.73 13.41
95 0.20 -0.09 0.11 0.06 -0.03 0.03







10 0.05 0.01 0.06
% 83.33 16.67 25.53
25 0.06 -0.01 0.05
% 120.00 -20.00 21.28
50 0.10 -0.05 0.06
% 190.91 -90.91 23.40
75 0.11 -0.07 0.04
% 275.00 -175.00 17.02
95 0.07 -0.04 0.03
% 233.33 -133.33 12.77
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10 0.65 0.10 0.75 0.21 -0.02 0.19
% 86.67 13.33 52.08 110.53 -10.53 29.23
25 0.28 0.07 0.35 0.37 -0.15 0.22
% 80.00 20.00 168.18 -68.18 33.85
50 0.13 0.10 0.23 0.60 -0.35 0.25
% 56.52 43.48 15.97 240.00 -140.00 38.46
75 0.07 0.15 0.22 0.58 -0.35 0.23
% 46.67 68.18 15.28 252.17 -152.17 35.38
95 0.00 0.24 0.24 0.15 -0.17 -0.02












10 0.52 0.06 0.58 0.54 0.36 0.90
% 89.66 10.34 44.27 60.00 40.00 55.90
25 0.31 0.05 0.36 0.57 0.20 0.77
% 86.11 13.89 27.48 74.03 25.97 47.83
50 0.20 0.06 0.26 0.32 0.09 0.41
% 76.92 23.08 19.85 78.05 21.95 25.47
75 0.14 0.12 0.26 0.18 0.09 0.27
% 53.85 46.15 19.85 66.67 33.33 16.77
95 0.02 0.19 0.21 -0.17 0.20 0.03







10 0.18 0.12 0.30
% 60.00 40.00 40.54
25 0.12 0.08 0.20
% 60.00 40.00 27.03
50 0.11 0.05 0.16
% 68.75 31.25 21.62
75 0.07 0.08 0.15
% 46.67 53.33 20.27
95 -0.03 0.16 0.13
% -23.08 123.08 17.57
34Table 5: Main Occupation of wives and husbands in 2006 with EU-
SILC data
Occupation Wife Husband
Legislators, senior ocials and managers 0.09 0.23
Corporate managers 1.11 3.29
Managers of small enterprisers 4.62 5.68
Physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals 0.77 2.68
Life science and health professionals 1.61 1.59
Teaching professionals 5 2.32
Other professionals 1.94 2.41
Physical and engineering science associate professionals 0.73 4.16
Life science and health associate professionals 3.08 0.89
Teaching associate professionals 2.82 0.49
Other associate professionals 7.31 5.74
Secretaries and keyboard-operating clerks 10.76 5.83
Customer services clerks 3 1.32
Personal and protective services workers 10.81 4.97
Models, salespersons and demonstrators 7.04 2.07
Skilled agricultural and shery workers 7.59 7.75
Extraction and building trades workers 0.65 11.74
Metal, machinery and related trades workers 0.73 7.82
Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trades workers 1.41 1.1
Other craft and related trades workers 6.4 3.67
Stationary-plant and related operators 0.56 2.28
Machine operators and assemblers 3.94 3.59
Drivers and mobile plant operators 0.33 7.31
Sales and services elementary occupations 12.71 3.82
Agricultural, shery and related laborers 3.01 1.74
Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 1.91 3.72
Armed forces 0.08 1.8
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